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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
I. EQUAL PROTECTION-THE DOUBTFUL VITALITY OF THE
RATIONAL RELATION STANDARD FOR REVIEWING STATUTES
AFFECTING CIVIL LIABILITY IN SOUTH CAROLINA
The parental immunity doctrine in South Carolina tradi-
tionally prevented minors from bringing tort actions against
their parents. That restriction lost much of its force in 1962
when the South Carolina Legislature passed a statute, now codi-
fied at section 15-5-210 of the South Carolina Code, permitting
minors to sue their parents for injuries arising out of automobile
accidents.1 In Elam v. Elam,' the South Carolina Supreme Court
ruled that section 15-5-210 violated the equal protection clauses
of the South Carolina and United States Constitutions.3 The
court in Elam also abolished, on equal protection grounds,
South Carolina's common-law doctrine of parental immunity.
4
In Elam, unemancipated minors were injured while riding
in automobiles driven by their parents. The minors brought neg-
ligence actions against their parents as permitted by section 15-
5-210 of the South Carolina Code,5 and the parents responded
by challenging the statute on equal protection grounds.6 The
trial court found the statute unconstitutional, and the minors
appealed in order to preserve their right to recovery. Arguing for
the constitutionality of the statute, the minors contended that it
was rationally related to two legitimate state interests: "preserv-
ing family tranquility and.., protecting the victims of automo-
bile accidents."" The supreme court, apparently unpersuaded by
1. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-5-210 provides that "[a]n unemancipated child may sue and
be sued by his parents in an action for personal injuries arising out of a motor vehicle
accident. In any such action there shall be appointed a guardian ad litem as provided by
law for such child."
2. - S.C. _, 268 S.E.2d 109 (1980).
3. Id. at _, 268 S.E.2d at 110.
4. Id. at _, 268 S.E.2d at 110-11. For a discussion of the tort law aspects of Elam,
see Torts, Annual Survey of South Carolina Law, 33 S.C.L. REv. - (1981).
5. See note 1 supra for the text of the statute.
6. Record at 1-2.
7. Order at 6-.
8. Brief of Appellant at 5.
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this argument, stated that "there is no valid reason to treat un-
emancipated minors differently from their peers tortiously in-
jured in other ways," cited to its earlier decision in Marley v.
Kirby, and affirmed the trial court's determination that section
15-5-210 was unconstitutional.'
In Marley, the court invalidated a statute that established
comparative negligence only for actions concerning motor vehi-
cle accidents and explained that "the requirement of equal pro-
tection is not fulfilled unless the classification rests upon some
difference which bears a reasonable and just relation to the legis-
lative purpose sought to be effected." 10 The court then reasoned
that "the extension of [the state's police] power to alter a sub-
stantive rule of negligence law with respect to one class of per-
sons [was] improper" and concluded that "there is no rational
basis for separating injuries from motor vehicle accidents from
injuries from other torts."1
The court's summary treatment of the equal protection is-
sue in Elam is troublesome because the court, in considering the
constitutionality of section 15-5-210, failed to discuss the legisla-
tive purposes of the statute. Reliance on Marley cannot justify
this omission because Marley considered the constitutionality of
a different statute with presumably different legislative pur-
poses. Moreover, the court in Marley also failed to discuss the
legislative purposes for the statute under review.
Elam is the latest in a line of equal protection cases in
which the court has examined the constitutionality of statutes
affecting civil remedies. In the earliest of these cases, Green v.
Zimmerman,12 the court upheld a statute that imposed strict lia-
bility on the owners of aircraft but held nonowner pilots to only
a negligence standard,13 articulating the rational relation test as
follows: "[A] statute. . . promulgated under state authority will
be found to violate equal protection only when it results in dis-
crimination against a certain class and the classification is not
rationally related to any legitimate state policy or interest." 4
9. 271 S.C. 121, 245 S.E.2d 604 (1978).
10. Id. at 124, 245 S.E.2d at 606.
11. Id. at 124, 245 S.E.2d at 606.
12. 269 S.C. 535, 238 S.E.2d 323 (1977).
13. S.C. CODE ANN. § 55-3-60 (1976).
14. 269 S.C. at 540, 238 S.E.2d at 325 (citing Hawkins v. Moss, 503 F.2d 1171 (4th
Cir. 1974)).
[Vol. 33
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This formulation appears to dictate a two-prong test: the court
must first determine the legitimacy of the state policy or interest
on which a statute is based, and then the court must decide
whether the classification created by the statute is rationally re-
lated to the state policy or interest. In Green, the court dis-
cussed the legislative purposes on which the statute under re-
view was based, determined them valid, and concluded that the
classification created by the statute was reasonable.1 5
Of the six equal protection decisions that followed Green,
the court has discussed the legislative purposes of the statute
under review in only two. State v. Smith' affirmed the constitu-
tionality of a provision of the South Carolina Blue Laws that
permitted only those grocery stores with fewer than three em-
ployees to remain open on Sunday. 17 Observing that the purpose
of the statute was to provide for the health and welfare of the
populace by making grocery items available while extending a
day of rest to the maximum number of people, the court deter-
mined this purpose valid and concluded that the statute was
consistent with it.'8 Ramey v. Ramey" invalidated South Caro-
lina's guest passenger statute0 because it was "limited to motor
vehicles and [was] accordingly defective under Marley." The
court discussed two legislative goals for the statute: "the protec-
tion of host drivers from suits by ungrateful guests; and ... the
elimination of collusive lawsuits" and concluded that the statute
served neither purpose.2 '
In the remaining decisions in the Green-Elam line, the
court gave no indication that it had considered the legislative
purposes for the statutes under review. Broome v. Truluck'2 in-
validated a special statute of limitations that was applicable to
architects, engineers, and contractors who construct defective
buildings but not applicable to building owners.24 Without dis-
15. Id. at 540, 238 S.E.2d at 325.
16. 271 S.C. 317, 247 S.E.2d 331 (1978).
17. S.C. CODE ANN. § 53-1-40 (1976).
18. 271 S.C. at 320-21, 247 S.E.2d at 332.
19. 273 S.C. 680, 258 S.E.2d 883 (1979).
20. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-1-290 (1976).
21. 273 S.C. at 685-86, 258 S.E.2d at 886.
22. Id. at 683, 685, 258 S.E.2d at 884, 885.
23. 270 S.C. 227, 241 S.E.2d 739 (1978).
24. Id. at 229, 241 S.E.2d at 740.
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cussing the legislative purposes for the statute, the court never-
theless found no apparent rational basis for distinguishing be-
tween the two groups,2 5 despite acknowledgement by other
jurisdictions of various purposes for similar statutes.2 6 Marley,
cited by the court in Elam, failed to discuss the legislative pur-
poses for the comparative negligence statute and ruled that -the
statute's effect, rather than its purpose, was invalid.28 Sapp v.
State Farm Automobile Insurance Co.29 upheld a statute that
denied unidentified motorist coverage for injuries caused by an
unidentified vehicle in the absence of physical contact with that
vehicleY' Without discussing the statute's legislative purposes,
the court summarily concluded that "the distinction is one
which the legislature was constitutionally privileged to make."8 1
Although the court purports to apply the rational relation
test in its equal protection decisions, it has failed to identify and
discuss legislative purposes for challenged statutes in the major-
ity of its recent decisions reviewing the constitutionality of stat-
utes challenged on equal protection grounds. Indeed, it has been
observed that "[t]he standards applicable to the constitutional
guarantee of equal protection have become little more than in-
cantations, ritualistically preceding the court's determination of
the merits of the particular case.
'3 2
Elam lends further credence to the conclusion that the
South Carolina Supreme Court has retained the rational relation
test as its equal protection standard in name only. In the portion
of the Elam decision that abolished the parental immunity doc-
trine, the court noted that it was not "blind to the existence of
universal automobile liability insurance" or unaware that a mi-
nor's suit against his automobile-driving parent is, in reality, a
25. Id. at 231, 241 S.E.2d at 740.
26. Carter v. Hartenstein, 248 Ark. 1172, 455 S.W.2d 918 (1970), appeal dismissed,
401 U.S. 901 (1971); Rosenberg v. Town of North Bergen, 61 N.J. 190, 293 A.2d 662
(1972); Josephs v. Burns, 260 Or. 493, 491 P.2d 203 (1971); Freezer Storage, Inc. v. Arm-
strong Cork Co., 234 Pa. Super. 441, 341 A.2d 184 (1975); Yakima Fruit & Cold Storage
Co. v. Central Heating & Plumbing Co., 81 Wash. 2d 528, 503 P.2d 108 (1972). See Con-
stitutional Law, Annual Survey of South Carolina Law, 31 S.C.L. REv. 21 (1980).
27. See notes 10 & 11 and accompanying text supra.
28. 271 S.C. at 125, 245 S.E.2d at 606.
29. 272 S.C. 301, 251 S.E.2d 745 (1979).
30. S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-9-850 (1976).
31. 272 S.C. at 303, 251 S.E.2d at 746.
32. Constitutional Law, supra note 26, at 32.
[Vol. 33
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suit against that parent's insurer.33 This implicit acknowledge-
ment of a legislative purpose to which the statute might be ra-
tionally related, as well as the court's tacit repudiation of the
state's interests in preserving family tranquility and protecting
automobile accident victims, suggests that the court applied an
unarticulated but stricter standard under which it invalidated
the statutory classification by making a subjective evaluation of
the effects of the statute.
A standard other than the rational relation test is not ordi-
narily applied by federal courts34 and the courts of other
states, 5 except to statutes restricting fundamental rights and
classifications constituting invidious discrimination. Indeed,
Justice Littlejohn, in his dissent to Ramey,17 called attention to
the firmly established South Carolina rule that "a statute will, if
possible, be construed so as to render it valid [and] will not be
declared unconstitutional unless its repugnance to the Constitu-
tion is clear and beyond reasonable doubt . . . ." In view of
the approach supported by the great weight of authority, the
South Carolina Supreme Court should return to an orthodox ap-
plication of the rational relation test when determining the con-
stitutionality of statutes that do not restrict fundamental rights
or create classifications that constitute invidious discrimination.
II. SEPARATION OF POWERS
The separation of powers clause of the South Carolina Con-
33. - S.C. at -, 268 S.E.2d at 111.
34. See Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 352 (1979); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina
Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
35. See Everett v. Goldman, 359 So. 2d 1256 (La. 1978); Pendergast v. Nelson, 256
N.W.2d 657 (Neb. 1977); Botsch v. Reisdorf, 226 N.W.2d 121 (Neb. 1975); Arneson v.
Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978).
36. An early but still authoritative exposition of the doctrine requiring strict scru-
tiny appears in Justice Stone's footnote in United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S.
144, 152 n.4 (1938). Suspect classifications include race, Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214 (1944); alienage, Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); possibly illegiti-
macy see Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968); but see Matthews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495
(1976); and possibly gender, see Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), but see
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). Fundamental rights generally are those rights guar-
anteed by the Bill of Rights. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
37. 273 S.C. at 686, 258 S.E.2d at 886 (Littlejohn, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 688, 258 S.E.2d at 886-87 (citing University of S.C. v. Mehlman, 245 S.C.
180, 139 S.E.2d 771 (1964); Nolletti v. Nolletti, 243 S.C. 20, 132 S.E.2d 11 (1963); Clark
v. South Carolina Pub. Serv. Auth., 177 S.C. 427, 181 S.E. 481 (1935).
1981]
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stitution provides that "[ifn the government of this State, the
legislative, executive, and judicial powers of the government
shall be forever separate and distinct from each other, and no
person or persons exercising the functions of one of said depart-
ments shall assume or discharge the duties of any other."-"' In
State ex rel. McLeod v. Yonce,'0 the South Carolina Supreme
Court held that section 58-3-145 of the South Carolina Code,'
which required the Chief Justice of the South Carolina Supreme
Court to appoint circuit judges to preside over contested utility
rate hearings, violated the separation of powers doctrine. The
court implied, however, that some overlapping of authority
among the branches of government might be permissible.'2 In
Williams v. Bordon's, Inc.,43 the court strictly construed the sep-
aration of powers clause and overturned section 2-1-150 of the
South Carolina Code, 44 which required state courts to grant au-
39. S.C. CONST. art. I, § 8. Enacted shortly after federal occupation of the state fol-
lowing the Civil War, the separation of powers clause contained a provision, later
dropped, stating that its purpose was "to the end that. . .[South Carolina Government]
would be a government of laws and not of men." J. WOODRUFF, PROCEDNGS OF THE
CONSTrrUTioNAL CoNvmEroN 314 (1868). In the 1868 Constitution, the clause immedi-
ately followed provisions protecting individuals from suspension of law, S.C. CONST. of
1868, art. I, § 24, and from the imposition of martial law, S.C. CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 25.
The historical record clearly establishes that the clause was enacted primarily to protect
citizens from suspension of legal rights by legislative or executive usurpation of judicial
functions. Id.
40. 274 S.C. 81, 261 S.E.2d 303 (1979).
41. S.C. CODE ANN. § 58-3-145 (Supp. 1980) provides in part:
The Public Service Commission shall notify the Chief Justice of the South
Carolina Supreme Court of all pending contested rate matters where the
amount in controversy... [exceeds] one million dollars annually. The Chief
Justice, when so notified or when otherwise requested to do so by the Chair-
man of the Commission, shall appoint a circuit judge to preside over the hear-
ings in such cases. Such judge shall have full authority to rule on questions
concerning the conduct of the case and the admission of evidence but shall not
participate in the determination on the merits of any such case.
42. 274 S.C. at 88, 261 S.E.2d at 306.
43. 274 S.C. 275, 262 S.E.2d 881 (1980).
44. S.C. CODE ANN. § 2-1-150 (Supp. 1980) provides in part:
Notwithstanding any other provisions of law or rule of court, no member
of the General Assembly shall be required to appear in court. . .during any
regular legislative day, on any day in which the General Assembly is in special
session, or on any other day when any legislator is required to attend any offi-
cial legislative committee meeting ....
... The right to a continuance, where such continuance is based upon an
attorney in such a case being a member of the legislature, shall be a matter of
right except in the following situations and under the following circumstances,
6
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tomatic continuances to lawyer-legislators under certain circum-
stances. The court's indication of flexibility in Yonce is difficult
to reconcile with the strict construction set forth in Williams.
A. Delegation of Executive Functions to the Judiciary
In Yonce, the court determined that the use of a circuit
judge as a presiding officer of the Public Service Commission in-
fringed upon the authority of both the executive and legislative
branches of state government in violation of the separation of
powers clause. The court observed that the statute reposed in a
member of the judiciary "tremendous potential for influencing
the result of matters being considered" by an executive agency,
45
permitted the Chief Justice to appoint the presiding officer of an
administrative body, and "limit[ed] the authority of the Chief
Justice to use judges for judicial duties as required by Article V
[of the South Carolina Constitution]. 4 4 The court recognized,
however, that "some overlapping authority has been tolerated"
and ruled only that "the degree of involvement here is such that
the Constitution mandates that [the statute] be declared
invalid.
4 7
Yonce presents the first indication that the court may be
willing to construe the separation of powers clause flexibly to
permit limited overlap between the branches of state govern-
ment. Just over two decades ago, in Board of Bank Control v.
Thomason,5 in which it was held that a county court had only
limited power to review a decision by an administrative body,
and none other, to wit-
(1) where litigation involves emergency relief and irreparable damage;
(2) where such attorney has previously been granted continuances for the
same case for a period greater than one hundred eighty days; or
(3) in a criminal case where the client is incarcerated unless the defendant
shall give his written consent to the continuance.
45. 274 S.C. at 85, 261 S.E.2d at 305. One concern in delegating executive power to
the judiciary is that it may involve the judiciary in conflicts which may be common to
the executive and legislative branches but from which the judiciary should be isolated.
Yonce appears unique in recognizing, as an element for consideration in separation of
powers cases, the political dangers that may arise out of undue judicial involvement in
executive decision making.
46. S.C. CONsT. art. V, § 4, provides that the Chief Justice shall "have the power to
assign any judge to sit in any court within the unified judicial system."
47. 274 S.C. 88, 261 S.E.2d 306.
48. 236 S.C. 158, 113 S.E.2d 544 (1960).
1981]
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the supreme court observed that "[t]he basic proposition that a
constitutional court should not be required to perform non-judi-
cial duties is probably beyond challenge. '49 Since Thomason, the
court has construed the separation of powers clause in a series of
decisions addressing overlapping functions of the executive and
legislative branches within the State Budget and Control Board,
an administrative board on which two legislators serve as ex of-
ficio members. In Elliott v. McNair,5" the court found no consti-
tutional violation, but the court discussed only the issue of dual
office-holding, 51 and passed over the separation of powers issue
without discussion. 2 In Mims v. McNair,"3 the court summarily
disposed of an asserted separation of powers violation on the
strength of Elliott.5 Soon after Mims, the South Carolina Con-
stitution was revised,55 and, in the most recent challenge to the
constitutionality of the State Budget and Control Board, State
ex rel. McLeod v. Edwards, 6 the court held that the reenact-
ment of the separation of powers clause without change signified
the General Assembly's contentment with the court's construc-
tion of the clause. The court further explained in dictum that
overlapping functions might be permitted where there is a coop-
erative effort between branches and no effort by one branch to
usurp the functions of another branch. 57 Yonce comports with
the court's tacit flexible construction of the separation of powers
clause in the Budget and Control Board cases but nevertheless
represents its first suggestion that overlapping executive and ju-
dicial functions may be permissible.
The courts of other states have been willing to sanction lim-
ited overlap of executive and judicial functions. The Illinois Su-
preme Court, in People v. Reiner, 8 analyzed the constitutional-
49. Id. at 165, 113 S.E.2d at 547.
50. 250 S.C. 75, 156 S.E.2d 421 (1967).
51. When Elliott was decided, the dual office holding proscription was contained in
S.C. CONST. art. II, § 2. Since that time, it has been transferred to S.C. CONST. art. XVII,
§ IA. Act No. 277, 1970 S.C. Acts, 57 Stat. 319.
52. 250 S.C. at 94-95, 156 S.E.2d at 431.
53. 252 S.C. 64, 165 S.E.2d 355 (1969).
54. Id. at 81, 165 S.E.2d at 363-64.
55. Act No. 1268, 1971 S.C. Acts, 56 Stat. 2684, transferred S.C. CONST. art. I, § 14,
to S.C. CONST. art. I, § 8.
56. 269 S.C. 75, 236 S.E.2d 406 (1977).
57. Id. at 83, 236 S.E.2d at 409.
58. 6 IlM. 2d 337, 129 N.E.2d 159 (1955)(statute requiring magistrate to forward re-
[Vol. 33
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ity of a statute requiring overlapping functions of the state's
executive and judicial branches and observed that the separation
of powers clause of the Illinois Constitution "does not command
that the judiciary be kept aloof from the general operation of
government beyond the point necessary to preserve judicial in-
dependence and to avoid the dissipation of energy which should
be conserved for judicial duties."5 9 In Hill v. Relyea,60 the Illi-
nois court explained that delegation of a legislative function to
the judiciary is permissible as long as the function delegated
does not require judicial approval of administrative actions.6 1
The Florida Supreme Court, in State ex rel. Gerstein v.
Schwartz, 62 recognized that the legislature may constitutionally
"confer on the judiciary reasonable duties designed to control
law enforcement .. ."s The Court of Appeals of New York, in
Rosenthal v. McGoldrick," acknowledged that "the rule that the
judiciary may not be charged with administrative functions does
not apply when such functions are 'reasonably incidental to the
fulfillment of judicial duties.' "65
The court in Yonce did not adopt a dogmatic approach to
the separation of powers guarantee but implicitly recognized
that, under conditions of minimal involvement, the legislature
may constitutionally delegate certain executive functions to judi-
cial officers. 6 The court, in the spirit of Justice Holmes' obser-
vation that "we . . . cannot carry out the distinction between
[branches of government] with mathematical precison and di-
vide the branches into watertight compartments, 8 7 indicated a
measure of flexibility and deference to practicality in applying
the separation of powers principle to state government. The de-
gree of overlapping legislative and judicial functions that is per-
missible in South Carolina, however, remains to be defined.
ports of convictions of traffic offenses to Secretary of State constitutional).
59. Id. at 343-44, 129 N.E.2d at 162.
60. 34 Ill. 2d 552, 216 N.E.2d 795 (1966).
61. Id. at 557, 216 N.E.2d at 798.
62. 357 So. 2d 167 (Fla. 1978).
63. Id. at 168.
64. 280 N.Y. 11, 19 N.E.2d 660 (1939).
65. Id. at 14, 19 N.E.2d at 661.
66. 274 S.C. at 88, 261 SXE.2d at 306.
67. Springer v. Government of the Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 211
(1928)(Holmes, J., dissenting). See 1 F. CoOmm, STATE AuimsmNTATm LAW 26-27
(1965).
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B. Procedural Rulemaking Power
In Williams v. Bordon's, Inc.,6 8 the South Carolina Supreme
Court held that a statute requiring state courts to grant auto-
matic continuances to legislators in certain circumstances, 69 "in
so far as it attempts to exercise the ultimate authority to deter-
mine when, and under what circumstances, lawyer-legislators
may be exempt from court appearances, is unconstitutional as
violative of the principle of separation of powers."70 The su-
preme court then examined the trial court's denial of a motion
for continuance. It found that the trial court had abused its dis-
cretion and explained that "as a general rule, a request for a
continuance in a civil case because of counsel's legislative duties
should be granted, when timely requested and made in good
faith, unless a substantial right of the parties to the litigation
will be defeated or abridged by the delay.
7 1
The supreme court reasoned that the authority to grant
continuances has both historical and constitutional origins, and
explained that "[i]t has long been the rule in this State that mo-
tions for a continuance are addressed to the sound discretion of
the trial judge. 7'2 The court then traced the authority to grant
continuances to powers conferred on the state judiciary by the
South Carolina Constitution.73 Finally, relying on Carolina
Glass Co. v. State,7 4 the court ruled that the separation of
powers clause of the South Carolina Constitution prohibited the
legislature from exercising the judicial power to grant
continuances.
75
Although Williams' simultaneous abrogation of a procedural
68. 274 S.C. 275, 262 S.E.2d 881 (1980). See notes 43-44 and accompanying text
supra.
69. S.C. CODE ANN. § 2-1-150 (Supp. 1980) is set forth in part in note 44 supra.
70. 274 S.C. at 280, 262 S.E.2d at 884.
71. Id. at 280, 262 S.E.2d at 884.
72. Id. at 279, 262 S.E.2d at 883 (citing South Carolina Pub. Serv. Auth. v. Carolina
Power & Light Co., 244 S.C. 466, 137 S.E.2d 507 (1964); State v. Lytchfield, 230 S.C. 405,
95 S.E.2d 857 (1957)).
73. S.C. CONsT. art. V, § 1, provides: "The judicial power shall be vested in a unified
judicial system which shall include a Supreme Court, a Circuit Court, and such other
courts of uniform jurisdiction as may be provided for by general law."
74. 87 S.C. 270, 69 S.E. 391 (1910), afl'd, 240 U.S. 305 (1916).
75. 272 S.C. at 280, 262 S.E.2d at 884. The separation of powers clause is found at
S.C. CONsT. art. I, § 8. For the full text of the provision, see the text accompanying note
39 supra.
[Vol. 33
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statute and announcement of a procedural rule made little dif-
ference in South Carolina procedural law regarding lawyer-legis-
lators, the rationale used by the court is troublesome. The his-
torical powers of the South Carolina judiciary may not be as
broad as the court indicated. It has been observed that since co-
lonial times, the power to make procedural rules in this state has
resided in the legislature with the acquiescence of the courts.7
Moreover, "[c]olonial and nineteenth-century American history
does not provide any additional support for an inherent proce-
dural rule-making power in the judiciary. Quite the contrary, the
regulation of practice and procedure in the United States has
consisted largely of the 'persistent use of legislation.' "7 This
impugns the court's rationale in Williams that the rulemaking
power has historically resided in the judiciary.
The court's recognition of a constitutional basis for exclu-
sive judicial authority to grant continuances can also be ques-
tioned. Although the court traced this authority to article V, sec-
tion 1, of the state constitution, 8 it disregarded other arguably
apposite constitutional provisions. Article V, section 4, expressly
states that the supreme court's power to make rules governing
practice and procedure is "[s]ubject to the statutory law
... . ,,79The legislative history of this clause unequivocally es-
tablishes that the clause was intended to subordinate the rule-
making power of the court to the higher authority of the General
Assembly. 0 Further, article II, section 11, grants to the legisla-
ture the power to "compel the attendance of absent members."81
Because these constitutional provisions arguably authorize the
legislature to grant automatic continuances to lawyer-legislators,
the court's limitation of its discussion to article V, section 4,
appears incomplete.
Finally, the court in Williams cited Carolina Glass"' to sup-
76. See 30 S.C.L. REv. 625, 628 (1979).
77. Id. at 637 (quoting Sunderland, The Exercise of the Rule-Making Power, 12
A.B.A.J. 548, 550 (1926).
78. For the text of S.C. CONST. art. V, § 1, see note 73 supra.
79. S.C. CONsT. art. V, § 4 provides in pertinent part: "The Supreme Court shall
make rules governing the administration of all the courts of the State. Subject to the
statutory law, the Supreme Court shall make rules governing the practice and procedure
in all such courts."
80. 30 S.C.L. REv. 625, 629-32 (1979).
81. S.C. CONST. art. III, § 11.
82. 87 S.C. 270, 69 S.E. 391 (1910), affd, 240 U.S. 305 (1916).
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port the proposition that the separation of powers clause8 s "is as
strong as it is simple and clear. The legislature therefore cannot
assume to itself the exercise of judicial powers."'" Yet in Caro-
lina Glass, the court declined to set a clear boundary between
the legislative and judicial powers, explaining that "[tihe lines of
demarcation between the powers of the three departments are
often shadowy and illusive . ". .. , The court in Carolina Glass
also noted that "[tihe exercise of judicial functions, or quasi ju-
dicial functions, is often necessary, as an incident, to the exer-
cise of the powers conferred by the Constitution upon the other
co-ordinate branches of the government .. ." Williams thus
seems to depart from the limited flexibility with which the court
in Carolina Glass construed the separation of powers clause.
Williams' pronouncement that procedural rulemaking
power is exclusively reserved to the judiciary constitutes a broad
extension of the judicial power coupled with a strict interpreta-
tion of the separation of powers clause. The basis for the broad
extension of the judicial power is tenuous, and the strict inter-
pretation of the separation of powers clause is difficult to recon-
cile with the court's more flexible application of the clause in
State ex rel. McLeod v. Yonce.
Belton T. Zeigler
83. See text accompanying note 39 supra.
84. 274 S.C. at 280, 262 S.E.2d at 884 (quoting Carolina Glass, 87 S.C. at 290, 69
S.E. at 399).
85. 87 S.C. at 291, 69 S.E. at 399.
86. Id. at 291, 69 S.E. at 399.
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